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CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS, OVER-DETERRENCE AND
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY AFTER IQBAL
by
*
Sheldon Nahmod
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court conditioned supervisory liability under
§ 1983 and Bivens on direct constitutional violations by supervisors.
This decision conflicts with the causation approach, under which
supervisory liability could be based on the causal link between the
supervisor’s knowledge of unconstitutional conduct by the supervisor’s
subordinates and the plaintiff’s constitutional injuries—which was
conceded by the defendants in Iqbal and was the prevailing standard in
the circuits prior to the decision in that case. In this Article, I explore the
Court’s growing concern with over-deterrence of government officials in
§ 1983 and Bivens cases, and describe how it led to this substantive
change in the law of supervisory liability. I discuss the standard in the
circuits prior to Iqbal and explain why the constitutional approach
adopted in Iqbal is the better one based on the language and legislative
history of § 1983, as well as relevant policy considerations. I also
address the deficiencies of the Iqbal decision and argue that the
constitutional approach may not improve the over-deterrence problem.
Finally, I analyze the inconsistencies between Iqbal and other § 1983
cases, but conclude that, in spite of its flaws, Iqbal got supervisory
liability right.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Ashcroft v. Iqbal is obviously an extremely important federal pleading
decision. But it is significant for another, perhaps less obvious, reason:
2
the Court’s conditioning of supervisory liability under both § 1983 and
3
Bivens —Iqbal involved Bivens-type claims—on constitutional violations by
supervisors themselves. This substantive limitation, which I here call the
4
“constitutional approach,” was seemingly the product of little or no legal
analysis and was, moreover, created by the Court without briefing and
argument. Also, it flew in the face of a concession on the record by the
defendants in Iqbal—former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and
1

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
Section 1983 reads as follows: “Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006). Section 1983 is the subject of my three-volume treatise. SHELDON H.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th
ed. 2009) [hereinafter CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION].
3
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (Court held that a Fourth Amendment damages action was available
against federal law enforcement officers).
4
In an early article on this topic, I called this approach the “Fourteenth
Amendment approach.” Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section
1983 Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15 n.93 (1982) [hereinafter Nahmod, Constitutional
Accountability]. I use the same terminology in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation. 1
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 3:97. But here I call it the “constitutional
approach” because it covers Bivens actions as well as § 1983, and is therefore broader
than the Fourteenth Amendment standing alone.
2
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F.B.I. Director Robert Mueller—that supervisory liability could be based
on the causal link between their actual knowledge of, and deliberate
indifference to, the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates and
5
the plaintiff’s constitutional injuries. I call this the “causation
6
approach,” the prevailing standard in the circuits for supervisory liability
7
before Iqbal was handed down.
The precise substantive issue decided by the Court in Iqbal can be
illustrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that employees in a
state or local government licensing office regularly discriminate on racial
grounds in the awarding of licenses. Suppose further that their
supervisors are actually aware of this racial discrimination but are
deliberately indifferent to it and therefore do little or nothing to stop it.
It is clear that the employees have violated equal protection and are
therefore liable under § 1983, but what of the supervisors?
According to the Court in Iqbal, the supervisors can only be liable
under § 1983 if it is proved that they themselves had the purposeful
8
discriminatory intent required for an equal protection violation. Their
actual knowledge and deliberate indifference may be relevant to an
evidentiary finding of purposeful discrimination, but, if purposeful
discrimination is not proved, then the supervisors have not themselves
violated equal protection and are therefore not liable under § 1983

5

The lack of briefing and argument, together with defendants’ concession, is
noted and discussed by Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer, in his dissent. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956–57. I contend later that the Court
nevertheless got it right when it adopted the constitutional approach. See discussion
infra Part IV.
6
I call this the “causation approach” because it is grounded on the causal link
between a supervisory defendant’s deliberate indifference—a state of mind not based
on any particular constitutional provision—and the subordinate’s violation of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In Constitutional Accountability, I similarly called it the
“causation approach.” Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 15.
However, in §§ 3:98 and 6:50 of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation, I called it,
perhaps misleadingly, the “negligence/causation approach.” 1 & 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 3:98, 6:50. This latter terminology was based on the
concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, in
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), a local government failure to train
decision handed down before City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), discussed
below. In Tuttle, Justice Brennan maintained that there could be local government
liability for failure to train for “a policy or custom that would foreseeably and
avoidably cause an individual to be subjected to deprivation of a constitutional right.”
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 832. This is classic negligence language. Subsequently, in Harris,
the Court as a matter of § 1983 statutory interpretation rejected negligence as the
state of mind for local government failure to train liability and instead settled on
deliberate indifference. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. See infra text accompanying notes 14–
16.
7
It must be emphasized that the constitutional and causation approaches are
matters of statutory interpretation with respect to § 1983, and are matters of federal
common law with respect to Bivens.
8
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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9

under the constitutional approach. This departed from the causation
approach consensus in the circuits that deliberate indifference together
with actual knowledge was enough for supervisory liability, assuming that
10
the subordinates violated the Constitution. In a very real sense, the
theoretical difference between the constitutional approach and the
causation approach is all about the source of the fault required for
supervisory liability: is that source exclusively the relevant constitutional
provision or is it also § 1983 itself?
I propose to situate Iqbal in the context of § 1983 and Bivens
jurisprudence and to describe how the Court’s increasing concern with
11
over-deterrence of government officials in § 1983 and Bivens litigation
has led in the past several decades to major pro-defendant changes in
such litigation. This concern has migrated from its traditional location,
the affirmative defense of individual immunities (absolute and qualified
12
immunity), through the constitutional merits, and now to pleading
itself. Furthermore, Iqbal’s adoption of the constitutional approach
suggests that the same concern with over-deterrence is responsible for
this substantive change in the law of supervisory liability under § 1983
13
and Bivens.
The Court’s constitutional approach to supervisory liability in Iqbal is
one that I initially advocated over twenty-five years ago for both
14
supervisory liability and local government liability. This was seven years
before the Court handed down City of Canton v. Harris, which announced
a deliberate indifference standard for local government liability for
15
failure to train as a matter of § 1983 interpretation. Harris explicitly
16
adopted the causation approach, contrary to my earlier position.
Prompted by Iqbal, I revisit that position here but again conclude that the
9

Id.
See infra Part III.B.
11
By “over-deterrence” I mean the more than optimal deterrence of, and
interference with, the independent decision-making of state and local government
officials as well as federal officials. Where there is optimal deterrence, only
unconstitutional conduct is deterred; where there is over-deterrence, constitutional
conduct is deterred as well. For a good example of the application of economic
analysis to individual immunities, see Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public
Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1118 (1981). See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 345 (2000) (criticized in Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective
Justice and Constitutional Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903, 904 (2001)).
12
See generally 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, chs. 7–8 (on absolute
immunity and qualified immunity, respectively).
13
As discussed later, this concern will not invariably be advanced under the
constitutional approach. See infra Part IV.B.
14
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 21–32.
15
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
16
After Harris was handed down, I acknowledged in earlier editions of my
treatise that it was contrary to the constitutional approach I advocated. See 1 CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 3:99, 6:50 (on supervisory liability and local
government liability, respectively).
10
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constitutional approach to supervisory liability remains the better one.
For all its process flaws, Iqbal got supervisory liability right.
This Article is divided into the following parts. In Part II, I survey
relevant aspects of the law of § 1983 and Bivens. Painting with a broad
brush and for the most part descriptively, I maintain that the Court’s
concern with over-deterrence has increasingly dominated constitutional
torts. In Part III, I address the relevance of that concern for supervisory
liability, set out what the Court said about supervisory liability in Iqbal,
and very briefly summarize the pre-Iqbal circuit consensus on supervisory
liability. In Part IV, I delve more deeply into the nature of supervisory
liability and conclude that the Court, although without any real analysis,
reached the correct result in Iqbal. Section 1983’s legislative history, its
language, and, especially, policy considerations all cut in favor of the
constitutional approach under which it is the relevant constitutional
provision that supplies the requisite state of mind, or fault. However, to
the extent that Iqbal’s adoption of the constitutional approach to
supervisory liability was motivated by a concern with over-deterrence, I
argue that this concern will not necessarily be advanced. It all depends
on the particular constitutional violation.
Finally, I address the glaring inconsistency between Iqbal’s
constitutional approach and Harris’s deliberate indifference standard for
17
§ 1983 local government liability for failure to train. The Court in Harris
explicitly and incorrectly grounded this standard on the causation
approach under which the requisite state of mind, or fault, is supplied by
18
§ 1983. Local government liability under § 1983 must, of course, be
based on an official policy or custom which, when implemented by local
19
government officials or employees, causes a constitutional deprivation.
But the official policy or custom requirement is really all about
constitutional accountability and should instead have been grounded on
20
the constitutional approach.

17

The Court may one day have to confront this inconsistency. See discussion infra
Part IV.D.
18
Harris, 489 U.S. at 388.
19
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 694 (1978) (according to
the Court, what is required for § 1983 local government liability is that the “execution
[by local government officials] of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by
its law makers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury”).
20
See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29. See also 2 CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 6:50.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND AVOIDING OVERDETERRENCE
A. Avoiding Over-Deterrence Has Increasingly Become a Major Factor in § 1983
and Bivens Jurisprudence
Constitutional tort litigation has, from the beginning, been animated
21
by various factors. From a plaintiff’s perspective, compensation and
deterrence factors are inherent in the primary purpose of § 1983 as a
matter of statutory interpretation: the enforcement of the Fourteenth
22
Amendment through damages liability. These are also inherent in the
23
birth of Bivens claims against federal officials. So, too, is the punitive
24
factor in the § 1983 and Bivens settings, at least as to individual liability.
Structural considerations are similarly implicated in § 1983 and Bivens
litigation: federalism in the one case and separation of powers in the
other. Federalism is implicated in § 1983 litigation because it is federal
courts that, through damages liability, enforce this federal legislation and
the Fourteenth Amendment against state and local government officials
and local governments (but not states), thereby intervening in, secondguessing, and affecting their decision-making processes. Separation of
powers is implicated in Bivens litigation because federal courts, in the
absence of legislation and through their own creation of Bivens damages
21

See generally 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 1:5–1:9.
Section 1983 began as § 1 of the Ku Klux Clan Act of 1871, enacted by
Congress pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its purpose appears
in the title: “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.” Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
The Supreme Court explained in Mitchum v. Foster: “The very purpose of § 1983
was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of
the people’s federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’”
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1880)).
23
As the Court stated in Bivens: “That damages may be obtained for injuries
consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should
hardly seem a surprising proposition. Historically, damages have been regarded as
the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. Of course, the
Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an
award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. But ‘it is . . . well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done.’ The present case involves no special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395–96 (1971) (citations
omitted) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
24
See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 48–49 (1983) (setting out a reckless or callous
indifference standard for punitive damages liability; malice or evil intent is not
required). However, local governments are not liable for punitive damages. City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). See generally 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 4:39–4:63 (on § 1983 punitive damages).
22
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remedies, are enforcing the constitution against federal officials (typically
25
executive officials).
From a defendant’s perspective, two additional factors—conserving
federal judicial resources and avoiding trivializing constitutional rights—
emerge particularly in connection with the threshold inquiry into
whether a § 1983 or Bivens plaintiff has even stated a cause of action. This
is especially apparent in the substantive due process and Eighth
Amendment areas where the Court has used state of mind requirements
to perform an important gatekeeper function of keeping what it
26
considers to be trivial constitutional claims out of court. To the extent
that this also means that § 1983 and Bivens should not become fonts of
tort law, federalism and separation of powers are implicated here as
27
well.
Of particular relevance for present purposes is avoiding overdeterrence of individuals. This factor made an early § 1983 appearance
28
in Tenney v. Brandhove, an absolute legislative immunity decision handed
29
down a decade before the seminal decision in Monroe v. Pape. Avoiding
over-deterrence in the absolute immunity setting, meaning minimizing
not only the costs of liability but the costs of defending (including
discovery), has also become prominent in the qualified immunity setting,
particularly since 1982 when the Court handed down Harlow v. Fitzgerald
30
and significantly changed qualified immunity jurisprudence.

25
As Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens, observed: “the question is whether the
power to authorize damages as a judicial remedy for the vindication of a federal
constitutional right is placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress’
hands.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 400–02.
26
For example, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Court ratcheted up the state
of mind required for law enforcement officer liability in high-speed pursuit cases
from deliberate indifference to purpose to cause harm. 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998). The
Court did the same in the Eighth Amendment area when it ratcheted up the state of
mind required for liability of corrections officials in prison security cases from
deliberate indifference to malicious and sadistic intent to harm. Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986). It should be noted that the Court was also concerned with
over-deterrence in these cases. See discussion infra at Part II.C.
27
Ensuring that § 1983 does not become a “font of tort law” is a familiar trope.
See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
28
341 U.S. 367 (1951) (discussed in 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2,
§ 7:3). Tenney interpreted § 1983 against a background of common law immunity. Id.
at 372, 376.
29
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
30
457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow, a Bivens case, eliminated the subjective part of the
qualified immunity test and set out an objective unreasonableness test, so as to
eliminate what the Court called “frivolous” or “insubstantial” claims and to minimize
over-deterrence. Id. at 808. See 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 8:4–8:5
(for an analysis of Harlow).

Do Not Delete

286

2/11/2010 8:56 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

B. Individual Immunities: The Traditional Location for Avoiding OverDeterrence
There are three categories of privileged § 1983 and Bivens individual
defendants who are, by virtue of both common law immunity rules and
policy considerations, absolutely immune from damages liability:
legislators for the performance of legislative functions, judges for the
performance of judicial functions, and prosecutors for the performance
31
of advocative functions. When an individual defendant successfully
asserts absolute immunity, he or she is out of the case at that point even if
all of the allegations in the complaint are taken as true (that the
defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and caused harm).
The primary policy concern is that the functions performed are so very
important that we do not want this defendant—often high profile—to be
worried about the possibility of being sued rather than focusing on
making the difficult decisions that he or she is supposed to make. In
other words, the primary policy concern is the avoidance of overdeterrence of the individual defendant. This goes well beyond a concern
with the chilling effect of potential liability on individual decision-making
(the costs of liability): it extends to the chilling effect of the very possibility
of being sued on individual decision-making (the costs of defending) and,
as such, is a quite powerful affirmative defense. To repeat, absolute
immunity protects the individual even though all would agree that the
32
plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated.
This concern with the chilling effect that the possibility of being
sued has on decision-making—and thus with the costs of defending
(including discovery)—now drives not only absolute immunity but
qualified immunity as well. Originally, qualified immunity had both an
33
objective and subjective part and protected solely against liability. It was,
in most respects, a conventional affirmative defense. However, beginning

31

See generally 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 7:11–7:41, 7:42–7:62
(on judicial immunity and prosecutorial immunity, respectively). The President of
the United States is the only executive official who is absolutely immune from
damages liability for his unconstitutional official conduct. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 757 (1982).
32
Absolute immunity, when applied to a defendant’s unconstitutional conduct,
means that the plaintiff has to bear the costs of his or her constitutional injury. I have
argued elsewhere that this result is often inconsistent with corrective justice, a
concept that is Aristotelian in origin and means the remedying of harm caused to one
person by the wrongful conduct of another. Corrective justice also has Kantian
aspects insofar as it is based on the equal dignity of persons. See Sheldon Nahmod,
From the Courtroom to the Street: Court Orders and Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
613, 613, 615–16, 638–40 (2002) [hereinafter Nahmod, Courtroom to Street]. See also
Dauenhauer & Wells, supra note 11; Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 403 (1992); Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1859 (2000). See generally PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (David G. Owen
ed., 1995) (on corrective justice).
33
See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
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35

in 1982 with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, continuing through Mitchell v. Forsyth
36
in 1985, and culminating in Pearson v. Callahan in 2009, the Court
gradually transformed qualified immunity into the functional equivalent
of absolute immunity. Harlow eliminated the subjective part of qualified
immunity and instructed courts to decide qualified immunity (whether
37
raised by motion to dismiss or for summary judgment) before discovery.
Thereafter, the Court modified the final judgment requirement for
appeals and, in Mitchell, allowed interlocutory appeals from district court
denials of qualified immunity defense motions for summary judgment, at
38
least on issues of law. Finally, the Court in Pearson retreated from its
prior insistence that district courts deciding qualified immunity motions
39
must always rule on the constitutional merits first. The Court restored
the flexibility of district courts to decide cases for defendants on qualified
immunity grounds, if they wished to do so.
In these qualified immunity cases and others, the Court made clear
that it was particularly concerned with the costs of defending against
frivolous or insubstantial § 1983 and Bivens claims, and with weeding out
40
such claims before discovery and trial. And whatever one thinks of this
transformation of qualified immunity into the functional equivalent of
absolute immunity, it must be acknowledged that the traditional location
of a concern with avoiding over-deterrence is indeed in the individual
immunity-affirmative defense setting. This is where the interest of society
in independent decision-making by government officials—an
instrumental consideration analytically distinct from the constitutional
merits—has been taken account of in § 1983 and Bivens jurisprudence.
As it turns out, though, the concern with avoiding over-deterrence under

34

457 U.S. 800 (1982).
472 U.S. 511 (1985).
36
129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
37
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808. Harlow was slightly modified with respect to discovery
in Anderson v. Creighton. 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (discussed at 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 8:12).
38
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527.
39
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 820–22. The Court had so insisted in cases such as Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
40
The Court explained in Harlow as follows: “We therefore hold that government
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Reliance
on
the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to
clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit
the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 818 (citations omitted).
In Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, I argued that
Harlow’s shift to objective reasonableness was based almost exclusively on
instrumental considerations and that § 1983 liability should be grounded on the
wrongdoing or fault inherent in the underlying constitutional violation. Sheldon
Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV.
997, 1004–06 (1990) [hereinafter Nahmod, Constitutional Damages].
35
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§ 1983 and Bivens has migrated to constitutional analysis, particularly
where § 1983 and Bivens damages liability is implicated, and now, in Iqbal,
to pleading.
C. The Constitutional Merits
It has been clear for some time now that the possibility of damages
liability under § 1983 and Bivens, and its feared impact on the
independence of public official decision-making, have affected the scope
of certain constitutional provisions. A good early example is Parratt v.
Taylor, a § 1983 prisoner case seeking damages for lost property, which
held, as a matter of procedural due process, that where the challenged
negligent conduct is random and unauthorized, there is no procedural
due process violation so long as there is an adequate state post41
deprivation remedy. Parratt was later overruled in part by Daniels v.
Williams, another prisoner case—this one involving personal injury—
which held that negligence was not enough for a “deprivation” of liberty
and ratcheted up the state of mind required for all due process violations
42
to “abuse of [government] power.” Both Parratt and Daniels modified
due process law for everyone, but they were motivated in large measure by
the Court’s concern that prison officials would otherwise be over43
deterred by excessive § 1983 prisoner litigation.
The Court has even more explicitly manipulated state of mind
requirements out of a concern with over-deterrence in § 1983 substantive
due process high-speed police chase cases. Thus, the Court held in
County of Sacramento v. Lewis that the state of mind required for a
substantive due process violation is not deliberate indifference but rather
44
“purpose to cause harm.” In this setting, where police officers do not
have time to deliberate, only the purpose to do harm constitutes
45
conscience-shocking conduct, according to the Court. Similarly, in the
§ 1983 Eighth Amendment setting the Court declared in Whitley v. Albers
that while the typical state of mind requirement for an Eighth
Amendment violation by prison officials in connection with conditions of
46
confinement is deliberate indifference, in prison security cases the state
41

451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330–31 (1986). Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (Court, concerned with
making § 1983 a “font of tort law,” held that an individual’s interest in reputation,
standing alone, is not a liberty interest for procedural due process purposes).
42
Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
43
That Parratt limited procedural due process protection for everyone was
troublesome if the Court’s motivation was to minimize the over-deterrence of prison
officials. Note that the latter goal is now implemented by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, which significantly limits § 1983 claims by prisoners. Pub. L. 104134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.)
44
523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (discussed in 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note
2, § 3:52).
45
523 U.S. at 853.
46
475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
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of mind required is “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” The
Court explained that in such cases prison officials needed to act quickly
and that they needed a margin for error in order to promote
48
independent decision-making.
But two recent § 1983 public employment cases are even more
striking than the preceding examples. The Court, concerned with overdeterrence, has used a categorical approach to exclude altogether the
applicability of the relevant constitutional provisions, in one case the First
Amendment and in the other the Equal Protection Clause. In Garcetti v.
Ceballos, the Court revisited a thirty-year old precedent and ruled that the
First Amendment is inapplicable to employer discipline directed at
49
public employees for speech arising from their employment duties. And
in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, the Court unpersuasively
distinguished a prior decision holding that class-of-one equal protection
claims are actionable, and held that the Equal Protection Clause simply
does not apply where a public employee, attempting to make such a classof-one claim, alleges that an employer discriminated against him or her
50
arbitrarily or capriciously. In both cases, the Court used a categorical
balancing approach and gave great weight to what it considered the
adverse impact of judicial intervention, potential liability, and the costs of
51
defending on independent decision-making in public employment.
D. Pleading and Iqbal
Against this background it should not be surprising that Iqbal
extended the new “plausibility” pleading standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

47
Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Thereafter, Farmer v. Brennan
declared that deliberate indifference in the Eighth Amendment setting means
subjective criminal recklessness. 511 U.S. 825, 839–40 (1994) (discussed in 1 CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 3:32).
48
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
49
547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). For analysis, see Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee
Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L.
REV. 561 (2008).
50
128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153–55 (2008) (this case distinguished Vill. of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam)).
51
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23; Engquist, 128 S. Ct. at 2154. The deep question of
whether, and under what circumstances, it is appropriate to take over-deterrence and
other instrumental factors into account in constitutional interpretation is a complex
one, well beyond the scope of this Article. I have attempted to be descriptive about
the extent to which the Court has done so in the § 1983 and Bivens settings. Richard
Fallon has argued that it is entirely appropriate to take such considerations into
account for the purpose of implementing the Constitution and that the Court has
frequently done so. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION
(2001).
I have some doubts about the soundness of emphasizing over-deterrence in
connection with § 1983 and Bivens causes of action against individuals because,
among other things, it amounts to double-counting: once for the constitutional
merits and again for the individual immunity inquiry.
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52

Twombly beyond antitrust to include § 1983 and Bivens claims. Even
though Iqbal applies to all federal court pleading, I want to note in
particular the Court’s emphasis in Iqbal on the heavy burden of discovery
on defendants in constitutional tort litigation and its adverse effect on
53
independent decision-making by government officials. Recall that this
burden has traditionally played (and still plays) a prominent role in a
quite different setting—the affirmative defenses of absolute and qualified
immunity. In marked contrast, the Court in Iqbal emphasized this
concern with over-deterrence in order to justify the creation of what is
effectively a heightened pleading requirement in § 1983 and Bivens cases
54
(although the Court refused to call it that). In my view, it is likely that
Iqbal’s “plausibility” pleading standard will be applied with extra bite in
constitutional tort cases against individual defendants. Indeed, that is
precisely the message that Iqbal was intended to send to district courts
and the circuits. This is so even if it turns out that Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, which rejected a
heightened pleading requirement for § 1983 claims against local
governments (which are not protected by qualified immunity), remains
55
good law.
Iqbal, of course, did much more than this to § 1983 and Bivens
claims. It also declared that supervisory liability could not be based on
supervisors’ actual knowledge of unconstitutional conduct and deliberate
56
indifference to it. Rather, the Court insisted, as a matter of statutory
interpretation under § 1983, and of federal common law under Bivens,
that a supervisor himself or herself must violate a plaintiff’s constitutional
57
rights in order to be liable for damages. It did so primarily because of its
concern with over-deterrence and the costs of defense, including the
58
burden of discovery.

52

127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965–66 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
54
Id. at 1953–54.
55
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 166, 168 (1993) (discussed at 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2,
§ 6:15).
56
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
57
Id. at 1949.
58
“If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the
formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require the
substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making
informed decisions as to how it should proceed.” Id. at 1953. While this statement was
made in connection with pleading, concern with the over-deterrence of “high-level
officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance
of their duties” permeates the entire decision. Id. at 1954.
53

Do Not Delete

2010]

2/11/2010 8:56 PM

SUPERVISORY LIABILITY AFTER IQBAL

291

III. IQBAL, OVER-DETERRENCE AND SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
A. The Iqbal Decision
Once the Court in Iqbal finished addressing the pleading issue in the
abstract, it turned to the precise case before it. The plaintiff, alleging
purposeful discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and ethnic
origin in connection with the conditions of his confinement, claimed
that defendants, Ashcroft and Mueller, actually knew that their
subordinates engaged in such discrimination and were deliberately
59
indifferent to it. Finding that the plaintiff’s allegations of such actual
knowledge and deliberate indifference were insufficient for supervisory
liability under Bivens, the Court simply asserted that inasmuch as
respondeat superior liability was not permitted under either § 1983 or
Bivens—a recurring theme in § 1983 jurisprudence—supervisory liability
60
required more than these allegations. “Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual
61
actions, has violated the Constitution.” In short, applying the
constitutional approach, the Court declared that a plaintiff claiming
supervisory liability had to allege and prove that the defendants
personally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. “Absent vicarious
liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is
62
only liable for his or her own misconduct.”
Consequently, because the constitutional violations asserted against
Ashcroft and Mueller in Iqbal required their own purposeful
discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin, the plaintiff’s
pleadings alleging only actual knowledge and deliberate indifference on
their part were insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. According
to the Court, which thereby rejected the causation approach, supervisory
liability was “a misnomer”: what was crucial for supervisory liability was
the requisite state of mind for the underlying constitutional violation,
63
namely, invidious purposeful discrimination by the two supervisors. As
justification for its determination that purposeful discrimination was
required for supervisory liability and that plaintiff’s allegations were
insufficient, the Court once more emphasized the costs of discovery and
59

Id. at 1944.
Id. at 1948. The Court’s continuing rejection of § 1983 respondeat superior
liability stems from the seminal decision of Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, which
adopted an official policy or custom requirement for local government liability. 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). For criticism of the Monell Court’s reliance on § 1983’s
“subjects, or causes to be subjected” language for its rejection of respondeat superior
liability for local governments, see 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 6:5–
6:6. As observed there, this is a question of Congressional intent, not Congressional
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. § 6:6 & n.9.
61
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
62
Id. at 1949.
63
Id.
60
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its adverse impact on the decision-making of high-ranking executive
64
officials. It also rejected the case-management approach that had been
suggested by the Second Circuit in Iqbal as a method of addressing the
65
concern with over-deterrence.
Justice Souter, the author of Twombly, dissented at some length,
66
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer. He criticized the
67
majority for the way it applied Twombly. But he appeared to be equally
68
distressed by the Court’s approach to supervisory liability. Indeed, he
contended that the Court had effectively eliminated supervisory liability
under Bivens: “Lest there be any mistake, in these words [‘the term
“supervisory liability” is a misnomer’] the majority is not narrowing the
scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability
69
entirely.” He complained that the defendants had conceded on the
record that supervisory liability could be based on actual knowledge of
70
unconstitutional conduct and deliberate indifference to that conduct.
What the Court did was thus unfair to the plaintiff because of the
absence of any opportunity to address the supervisory liability issue. In
addition, he maintained that there was a plausible middle position
between respondeat superior liability and the constitutional approach, as
71
demonstrated by the consensus in the circuits. The Court had not
seriously considered this possibility because it did not have the benefit of
72
briefing and argument on the proper standard of supervisory liability.
Justice Souter went on to suggest that the Court would have reached
the same result—that plaintiff did not state a Bivens supervisory liability
claim against the defendants—even under an actual knowledge and
73
deliberate indifference standard for supervisory liability. In all
likelihood, he was attempting to render as dicta the Court’s discussion
and adoption of the constitutional approach to supervisory liability.
B. Pre-Iqbal Law in the Circuits
Whatever one thinks should be the proper standard for supervisory
liability, it is surprising from a process perspective that the Court
announced that it was adopting the constitutional approach to
64

Id. at 1953.
Id.
66
Id. at 1954–61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 1955.
68
Id. at 1955–57.
69
Id. at 1957. Interestingly, Justice Souter’s discussion implied that the Court’s
adoption of the constitutional approach to supervisory liability did not necessarily
apply to § 1983, despite the fact that the Court repeatedly discussed § 1983 and Bivens
together.
70
Id. at 1956.
71
This middle position is the causation approach under which supervisory
liability can be based on actual knowledge and deliberate indifference. Id. at 1958.
72
Id. at 1957.
73
Id. at 1958.
65

Do Not Delete

2010]

2/11/2010 8:56 PM

SUPERVISORY LIABILITY AFTER IQBAL

293

supervisory liability under circumstances of no briefing and no argument.
This is particularly troubling because the circuits for the most part
adopted the causation approach. At the very least, the Court should have
explained itself much more than it did.
As Justice Souter indicated in his dissent, the circuits staked out a
position on supervisory liability somewhere between respondeat superior
liability and Iqbal’s constitutional approach. Most, perhaps all, of the
circuits agreed that actual knowledge of unconstitutional conduct by
subordinates and deliberate indifference to it were sufficient for
74
supervisory liability. Some went further and appeared to allow
supervisory liability for gross negligence even in the absence of actual
75
knowledge. But those decisions allowing supervisory liability for gross
negligence are questionable even under the causation approach. They
are inconsistent with the Court’s local government liability for failure to
train decision in City of Canton v. Harris, which set out a deliberate
indifference standard for local government failure to train liability as a
76
statutory matter. As the Third Circuit reasoned two decades before
Iqbal, it was confident that after Harris “the standard of individual liability
for supervisory public officials will be found to be no less stringent than
77
the standard of liability for the public entities that they serve.” In both

74

E.g., Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Martin,
195 F.3d 1208, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 1999); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir.
1995); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994); Shaw v.
Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953,
957 (1st Cir. 1992); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479–80 (3d Cir.
1990). See generally 1 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 3:100–3:103 (listing a
collection of cases from the various circuits regarding supervisory liability).
75
This was noted by Justice Souter in his dissent, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1958.
In Iqbal, the plaintiff pleaded at least actual knowledge on the part of the defendants
who allegedly “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject
plaintiff to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of
[his]religion, race and/or national origin for no legitimate penological interest.”
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 175 (2d Cir. 2007).
However, the Second Circuit had previously declared that gross negligence was
one of five ways of showing supervisory liability. Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137
(2d Cir. 2003). It restated this in Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 152. To the extent that
gross negligence has an objective “should have known” component, it could be
understood as constructive notice, thereby explaining the Court’s concern in Iqbal
with potential respondeat superior liability and the Court’s rejection of the causation
approach. Indeed, the second Question Presented in the Iqbal defendants’ Petition
for Writ of Certiorari was the following: “Whether a cabinet-level officer or other
high-ranking official may be held personally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional
acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they had
constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such subordinate
officials.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
(No. 07-1015) (emphasis added).
76
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
77
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).
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cases, the proper standard was “deliberate indifference to the plight of
78
the person deprived.”
As it turns out, the differences in real world impact of the two
supervisory liability standards—the constitutional and causation
approaches—are not as straightforward as the Court and even Justice
Souter made them out to be in Iqbal. But before turning to that, it is
necessary to analyze § 1983 (and Bivens) supervisory liability at a
theoretical level.
IV. THE NATURE OF SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
A. Constitutional Duty, Causation, and Fault: The Personal Involvement
Requirement
It is clear that in order for any defendant, individual or
governmental, to be liable under § 1983 and Bivens, there must be a
constitutional duty imposed on the defendant that runs to the plaintiff
and that is breached by the defendant. This follows from § 1983’s
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution” language as well as from the constitutional violation
required in Bivens actions. The breach of constitutional duty is also
normative in that it supplies the requisite threshold fault for § 1983 and
79
Bivens liability. Next, this breach of constitutional duty must have caused
the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. The causation requirement follows
not only from the “subjects, or causes to be subjected” language of § 1983
but, like fault, from the very notion of tort liability and responsibility as a
80
normative matter.
Over the years, the Court has put a gloss on causation in § 1983 and
Bivens cases and has characterized it as imposing a personal involvement
requirement that precludes respondeat superior liability. This personal
involvement requirement apparently includes some notion of affirmative
conduct constituting fault. The Court put it this way in an important
footnote in Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services: “[W]e would appear to have
decided that the mere right to control without any control or direction
having been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough
81
to support § 1983 liability.” According to the Court, then, the mere

78
Id. See also Schneider v. Simonini, 749 A.2d 336, 356 (N.J. 2000) (in a decision
examining § 1983 supervisory liability doctrine, the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted what it called the “intermediate” standard of “recklessness or deliberate
indifference”).
79
See generally, Nahmod, Constitutional Damages, supra note 40.
80
Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 408
(1987).
81
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978) (citing Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)). As further support for its conclusion, the Court in
Monell analyzed § 1983’s “subjects, or causes to be subjected” language as precluding
respondeat superior liability. It reasoned that the two primary policy justifications for
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failure to act, standing alone, is not enough for § 1983 and Bivens liability
even where there is a causal relation between the failure to act and the
constitutional injury. The Court’s primary concern was, and continues to
82
be, the avoidance of respondeat superior liability.
The Court in Iqbal thus articulated a new personal involvement
requirement for supervisory liability under Bivens when it declared as a
matter of federal common law that a Bivens defendant must personally
have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights in order to be liable,
83
even in a supervisory capacity. Causation accompanied by a state of
mind that is less than the constitutional minimum is insufficient personal
involvement for supervisory liability. Moreover, in explaining why Iqbal
also applied to § 1983 (which the Court said it did), the Court simply
asserted, as it had in Monell with regard to local government liability
84
thirty years earlier, that the “subjects, or causes to be subjected”
language precludes respondeat superior liability and therefore means
that the supervisory § 1983 defendant must personally have violated the
85
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
In short, the Court in Iqbal, adopting the constitutional approach,
interpreted federal common law and § 1983 to require for supervisory
liability the same state of mind as that for the underlying constitutional
86
violation. This constitutionally required state of mind, rather than
actual knowledge and deliberate indifference, now constitutes the
personal involvement requirement for supervisory liability. Under the
constitutional approach of Iqbal, then, the supervisory defendant’s fault is
such liability, accident reduction and loss-spreading under an insurance approach,
had been rejected in the legislative debates on § 1983. Id. at 691–94.
In Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, I argued that the official
policy or custom requirement for § 1983 local government liability is the functional
equivalent of the personal involvement requirement for § 1983 individual liability.
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29. More generally, I argued
that § 1983 local government liability and individual liability raise constitutional
accountability questions, the first involving institutional accountability, the second
involving individual accountability. See id.; discussion infra at Part IV.D.
82
This is parallel to the Court’s decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, which held as a constitutional matter that there is
generally no affirmative substantive due process duty to protect others from private
harm: “[N]othing in the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” 489 U.S.
189, 195 (1989).
83
That Iqbal is a personal involvement case involving supervisors is clear from the
Court’s description of the defendants’ motion to dismiss “for failure to state sufficient
allegations to show their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional
conduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
84
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–92.
85
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. The constitutional approach obviously poses no
problem in the typical § 1983 and Bivens non-supervisory liability case where
government officials are sued in their individual capacities for what they have
themselves done “hands-on” and personally to the plaintiff.
86
This means that the scope of the § 1983 duty and the Bivens federal common
law duty is the same as the scope of the underlying constitutional duty.
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derived from the Constitution alone and not from § 1983 or federal
common law. In contrast, under the causation approach rejected in Iqbal,
the supervisory defendant’s fault is derived from § 1983 or federal
87
common law.
The Court almost surely thought that this new personal involvement
requirement, based on the underlying constitutional provision, would
limit the individual damages liability of supervisors generally, and thereby
reduce over-deterrence not only in equal protection cases like Iqbal but
also in cases involving other constitutional violations. Conversely, Justice
Souter in his dissent complained that the Court had effectively
88
eliminated supervisory liability. However, neither position adequately
captures the real world impact of the choice between the constitutional
approach and the causation approach, or the theoretical complexity of
89
the issue.
B. Real World Impact: Other Hypotheticals
Equal Protection. What is at stake in terms of real world impact in
Iqbal’s constitutional approach to supervisory liability and the competing
causation approach may be illustrated by the following. Recall from the
first hypothetical at the beginning of this Article that under Iqbal, even
where subordinates have violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the
supervisor can only be liable in damages where that supervisor acted with
the same constitutionally required state of mind. So if, as alleged in Iqbal,
subordinates have violated equal protection—which requires purposeful
discrimination—the supervisor is only liable if the failure to supervise was
accompanied by purposeful discrimination as well. Actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference are now not enough even though the circuits
adopted the causation approach pre-Iqbal. Implicit in Iqbal is the
assessment that the causation approach over-protected constitutional rights.
It was probably for this reason that the requisite state of mind for
supervisory liability was ratcheted up in Iqbal.
Fourth Amendment. Suppose, though, that supervisors are sued under
§ 1983 for their failure to supervise police officers in making arrests
where the underlying conduct by subordinates is the use of excessive
87
Under the causation approach there must therefore be a constitutional
violation by a subordinate.
88
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957.
89
In contrast to the hypotheticals in Part IV.B, there is little difficulty where a
subordinate executes what turns out to be a supervisor’s unconstitutional order but
does not himself or herself violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Suppose, for
example, that a supervisor, acting on the basis of an impermissible racial motivation,
directs a subordinate to fire the plaintiff, and the subordinate, without knowing or
having any reason to suspect the supervisor’s motive, simply follows orders. Here, it is
only the supervisor, not the subordinate, who violated the plaintiff’s equal protection
rights and would be liable under § 1983 or Bivens. Both the constitutionally required
state of mind (or fault) and causation are directly traceable to the supervisor, even
though the subordinate’s conduct also played a causal role.
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force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The constitutionally
90
applicable state of mind is objective unreasonableness. Under Iqbal the
supervisors should be liable if they acted in an objectively unreasonable
way in failing to supervise. Before Iqbal they would have been liable only
if they acted with deliberate indifference, thereby arguably underprotecting Fourth Amendment rights. Because objective unreasonableness
is a lower and less culpable state of mind than deliberate indifference,
Iqbal may have expanded the scope of supervisory liability in the Fourth
Amendment setting by adopting the constitutional approach and
rejecting the causation approach, a result the Court may not have
91
foreseen and almost certainly did not intend.
It is, of course, possible—it may even be likely—that the Court, if
confronted with this situation, would impose a very strict proximate cause
requirement for supervisory liability, just as it did for local government
92
liability for hiring decisions in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown.
Consider the Brown proximate cause requirement:
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would
lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious
consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the
deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right can the
official’s failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant’s background
constitute “deliberate indifference.”93
Even though the Court articulated this strict proximate cause
requirement in the context of hiring decisions by local governments, it
turns out that it has been applied by the circuits in other local
94
government liability cases going well beyond hiring. If applied to the
Fourth Amendment hypothetical, this strict proximate cause
requirement could similarly condition supervisory liability on whether
the particular Fourth Amendment violation was the plainly obvious
consequence of the supervisor’s own objective unreasonableness.
Eighth Amendment and Substantive Due Process. Regardless of the
Court’s eventual proximate cause analysis in supervisory liability cases
involving Fourth Amendment violations by subordinates, it should be
noted that there are situations where the choice between Iqbal’s
constitutional approach and the causation approach may not make much
real world difference. For example, suppose that supervisors are sued for
90

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
Note, however, that this result is not over-protective of Fourth Amendment
rights, because there is a perfect fit (apart from immunities) between the supervisor’s
Fourth Amendment fault and the supervisor’s damages liability. To put this in
another way, the constitutional approach neither under-protects nor over-protects
constitutional rights.
92
520 U.S. 397 (1997).
93
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
94
See generally 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 6:44–6:48 (listing a
collection of federal and state cases addressing sufficiency of evidence for failure to
train, supervise, or hire).
91
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the Eighth Amendment or substantive due process violations of their
subordinates. If the constitutionally required state of mind for both of
these underlying constitutional violations by the subordinates is
deliberate indifference, it should make no difference to the outcome
whether the constitutional approach or the causation approach is
95
followed. Supervisory liability still would require deliberate indifference
by the supervisors, whether it is the constitutional or causation approach
that is applied, in conjunction with the unconstitutional deliberate
indifference of the subordinates.
C. The Constitutional Approach: Legislative History, the Language of § 1983,
and Policy Considerations
The choice between the constitutional approach and the causation
96
approach is not one of Congressional power. Congress surely has the
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact a statute
such as § 1983 that incorporates the causation approach. The question is
one of Congressional intent with regard to supervisory liability: does
§ 1983 create a Fourteenth Amendment damages action that is strictly
limited to the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment (including
incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights) such that a supervisory
defendant must always himself or herself violate the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to be liable in damages? Or does it create a
damages action that, while requiring a constitutional violation by a
subordinate, nevertheless provides for the damages liability of a
supervisory defendant causally (and somehow culpably) responsible for a
subordinate’s constitutional violation irrespective of the underlying
constitutional provision?
Legislative History. Although the legislative history of § 1983 does not
explicitly address the issue, it is at least suggestive of the constitutional
approach. Section 1983 is described as a statute that “reenact[s] the
97
Constitution” by Senator Edmunds. Representative Bingham, the
author of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, states that the
95

A caveat: “deliberate indifference” may mean different things depending on
the particular constitutional provision involved and on who is violating it. According
to the Court in Farmer v. Brennan, deliberate indifference of individuals for Eighth
Amendment purposes is subjective criminal recklessness as used in criminal law, while
deliberate indifference of local governments for failure to train liability is objective in
nature because it focuses on the state of mind of a governmental entity. 511 U.S. 825,
839–42 (1994). However, in light of the Court’s references to abuse of government
power and “the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience” in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, deliberate indifference of individuals for substantive due process
purposes will likely turn out to be similar, if not identical, to the subjective criminal
recklessness of Farmer in cases not involving high-speed police chases. 523 U.S. 833,
836, 845–46 (1998).
96
Just as Congressional power to impose respondeat superior liability on local
governments was not at issue in Monell. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
662–64 (1978). See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
97
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 569 (1871).
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purpose of § 1983 is “the enforcement . . . of the Constitution on behalf
of every individual citizen of the Republic . . . to the extent of the rights
98
guarantied [sic] to him by the Constitution.” Senator Thurman, a critic,
describes § 1983 as “authoriz[ing] any person who is deprived of any
right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution of the
United States, to bring an action against the wrongdoer in the Federal
99
Courts.” These portions of the legislative history support the
constitutional approach to the extent that they can plausibly be read for
the proposition that § 1983’s scope is identical to the scope of the
100
Fourteenth Amendment.
This interpretation of the legislative history is consistent with the
Court’s seminal decision in Monroe v. Pape, which determined that
§ 1983’s “color of law” language was not narrower in scope than the
101
Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement. More directly, the
Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. observed: “The history of the Act is
replete with statements indicating that Congress thought it was creating a
remedy as broad as the protection that the Fourteenth Amendment
102
affords the individual.”
Statutory Language. Similarly, the relevant language of § 1983 tends to
support the constitutional approach, although it, like the legislative
history, is not conclusive. This language renders liable in damages any
person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
103
Constitution and laws.” In support of the constitutional approach, the
“subjects, or causes to be subjected” language is intended simply to cover
those situations in which defendants either personally, or through
intervening actors, causally bring about constitutional deprivations. It has
no other meaning than this. Indeed, earlier examples of this usage
104
indicate that this was all that was intended by such language.
98

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 81 (1871).
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 216 (1871).
On the other hand, they can also be read as indicating only that § 1983 is not
narrower in scope than the Fourteenth Amendment, which is consistent with the
causation approach. See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 18–19
(discussing portions of the legislative history and related considerations).
101
365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
102
457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982).
103
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
104
Preliminary research into this and similar statutory language has uncovered
the following examples which indicate that § 1983’s “causes, or subjects to be caused”
language was intended solely as a formal matter to include both personal, hands-on
causation and causation through intervening actors.
(1). The debates of the 39th Congress, leading to the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, contained this section 8:
99

100

Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any State or
local law, ordinance, police, or other regulation or custom, shall, in any State or
district in which the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been
interrupted by the rebellion, subject or cause to be subjected, any negro, mulatto,
freedman, refugee, or other person, on account of race or color, or any previous
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condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or for any other cause, to the
deprivation of any civil right secured to white persons, or to any other or different
punishment than white persons are subject to for the commission of like acts or
offenses, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished by fine not
exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both . . . .

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 & 318 (1866) (second and third emphasis
added).
(2). Later in that same congressional session, Senator James Doolittle of
Wisconsin, introduced a bill pursuant to Section 2 of the 13th Amendment. That bill
contained the “subject, or cause to be subjected” language, along with several other
instances of “or cause to be”:
Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall unlawfully, and in
violation of the said thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, and of the
provision of this act, restrain, or cause to be restrained of his or her liberty, with
intent to subject, or cause to be subjected, or to hold, or to cause to be held, to service as
a slave, or involuntary servant, any person, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of
the court.
Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That any person who shall unlawfully, and in
violation of the provisions of the said thirteenth amendment to the Constitution
and the provisions of this act, restrain or cause to be restrained of his or her liberty,
with intent to hold or cause to be held to service as a slave or involuntary servant,
any person who has heretofore been held to slavery or involuntary servitude
under the laws of any State or Territory, and has been emancipated by the said
thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, commonly called a freedman, shall,
in addition to the pains and penalties provided in the last preceding section of
this act, be liable to be prosecuted by the person injured, who shall be entitled to
recover the sum of $1,000 . . . .

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1805 (1866) (second, third, and fifth emphasis
added).
This wording was likely intended to be parallel to an 1806 House Bill prohibiting
the importation of slaves into the United States and Territories. This bill may be the
first appearance of the “or cause to be” language in federal legislation, and is similarly
related to the issue of slaves and freedmen. (For what appears to be the first
appearance of the “or cause to be” language in state legislation, see Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 543–44 (1842), which discusses a 1780
Pennsylvania statute entitled “An act for the gradual abolition of slavery.”). The
relevant portion of the Bill read:
And if any person or persons shall, after the said thirty-first day of December,
transport or bring, or cause to be transported or brought into the United States, or the
territories thereof, any negro, mulatto, or person of color, contrary to the true
intent and meaning of this act, every person or persons, so offending, shall be
guilty of high misdemeanor, and being convicted before any Court having
competent jurisdiction shall suffer imprisonment not more than ten, nor less
than five years.

16 ANNALS OF CONG. 231–32 (1806) (emphasis added).
(3). The phrase “or cause to be” was used by legislators beginning in 1775. This
may indicate that it was imported into the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and then the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 (and § 1983), simply as a matter of form. The following are some
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Of course, it could be argued in support of the causation approach
that the clause “or causes to be subjected” was specifically intended to
cover those defendants such as supervisors who do not personally and in
a hands-on way violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights and to subject
them to a state of mind, or fault, requirement different from that
105
imposed on defendants who do so personally. But this statutory
representative examples (with emphasis added) of when the phrase “or cause to be”
was used:
(a) In the Secret Committee Minutes of Proceedings of October 25, 1775, the
document used the phrase “sell or cause to be sold.” Secret Committee Minutes of
Proceedings (Oct. 25, 1775), in 2 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 253, 254
(Paul H. Smith ed. 1775).
(b) In the Instruction to the commanders of private ships or vessels of war
authorizing them to capture British vessels and cargos, there was stated what to
do with captured documents: “you shall deliver, or cause to be delivered, to the judge
or judges, all passes, sea-briefs, charter-parties, bills of lading, cockets, letters,
and other documents and writing found on board . . . .” Instructions to the
commanders of private ships or vessels of war (1776), in 4 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 253, 254 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 1906).
(c) Following the reception of two letters from General Washington, the
Continental Congress passed a resolution for the safety council of Pennsylvania
requesting in part, “That the Secret Committee be directed to appoint one or
more trusty persons, to proceed immediately to the eastern states, and see that
the cloathing [sic] and stores, which have been ordered to be purchased for the
army, be collected and forwarded to the army, with all possible despatch [sic];
and that the said person, or persons, have power to purchase, or cause to be
purchased, such necessary cloathing as can be procured in those states, and to
have them forwarded to the army.” Resolution of Dec. 1, 1776, in 6 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 997.
(d) The Committee on Deserters of 1777 issued a report for the Continental
Congress’s consideration on a resolution authorizing “any constable, freeholder,
or Keeper of any public ferry within the United States, to apprehend or cause to be
apprehended, any person being a deserter, and cause such person to be brought
before any Justice of the peace . . . .” Report of Committee on Deserters (1777), in 7
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 115–16.
(e) A letter from Pennsylvania appointing delegates to the Continental Congress
stated, “We, reposing especial Trust and Confidence in your Prudence, Integrity,
and Abilities, do by these presents constitute and appoint you . . . to be our
Counsellors [sic] and Agents . . . . Hereby ratifying and confirming all and
whatsoever you our said Counsellors, Agents and Solicitor shall lawfully do or
cause to be done, touching or concerning the said Cause between the said States of
Pennsylvania and Connecticut.” Pennsylvania’s Credentials of Delegates (1782), in 22
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 345, 346 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1914).
(f) In the years following, the phrase was used mostly in connection with payment
(“pay or cause to be paid”) or delivery (“deliver or cause to be delivered”).
105

See Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section 1983
Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 147 (1997). Kit Kinports has argued in favor of the
causation approach (she did not call it that) with negligence as the requirement for
supervisory liability. She contended that my constitutional approach is not justified by
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language on its face addresses only causation and says nothing about any
supervisory liability state of mind requirement. In contrast, under the
constitutional approach this omission is not problematic if “or causes to
be subjected” is interpreted together with § 1983’s “deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” language. It
is the underlying constitutional provision that supplies the requisite state
of mind, or fault, for all § 1983 defendants, whether supervisors or other
individuals, regardless of whether any of them personally violated a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights or, through intervening actors, caused
that constitutional violation.
After all, these defendants are all suable “persons” within the
meaning of § 1983’s “Every person . . . shall be liable” language. Everyone
would agree that the fault of an individual defendant—a “person”—who
personally violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights is derived from the
underlying constitutional provision. Why should supervisors be treated
106
differently in this regard? There is no persuasive justification for having
different standards of fault for different “persons” that are dependent on
the causal manner in which they were responsible for the constitutional
violation.
107
Moreover, Parratt v. Taylor has conventionally been interpreted as
holding that § 1983 has no state of mind requirement for the prima facie
108
case as a matter of statutory interpretation. True, the Court could
simply have announced in Iqbal that deliberate indifference is the state of
mind required for supervisory liability, just as it did—incorrectly, in my
view—in connection with local government liability for failure to train in
109
City of Canton v. Harris. But there is no sound reason to do so in light of
§ 1983’s legislative history and, especially, its language: the requisite state
of mind, or fault, can readily be grounded on the relevant constitutional
provision, as it is under the constitutional approach. This is a
straightforward resolution of the statutory interpretation issue because

the causation language of § 1983. She also maintained that the constitutional
approach effectively “moots” supervisory liability where subordinates violate a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 161 n.71. As to § 1983’s language, my analysis
appears in the text and accompanying footnotes. As to mooting supervisory liability, I
demur. The issue in dispute is where the state of mind requirement, or fault, comes
from: from the relevant constitutional provision or from § 1983 itself. Under the
constitutional approach, supervisory liability is still with us.
106
Or, for that matter, local governments. See discussion infra at Part IV.D.
107
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
108
See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1986); Greenwich Citizens
Comm., Inc. v. Counties of Warren, 77 F.3d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1996); Pink v. Lester, 52
F.3d 73, 74 (4th Cir. 1995).
109
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). In Harris the Court, effectively adopting the
causation approach, determined as a matter of statutory interpretation that
deliberate indifference (together with causation) is required for local government
liability for failure to train. See discussion infra at Part IV.D.
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the fit between the constitutional violation, fault, and damages liability is
110
perfect.
Of course, this argument from the legislative history and language of
§ 1983 in favor of the constitutional approach does not apply to Bivens
actions. Strictly speaking, then, the Court was free in Iqbal to adopt the
causation approach to supervisory liability as a matter of federal common
law. However, the Court did not do so; instead, it adopted the
constitutional approach for Bivens supervisory liability claims. At the same
111
time, it made clear that Iqbal governs § 1983 supervisory liability as well.
Policy Considerations. Many have extensively discussed the policy
112
considerations underlying § 1983 elsewhere. I will therefore be terse.
Simply put, I submit that the constitutional approach provides a better fit
between § 1983’s policy considerations and damages liability for
Fourteenth Amendment violations.
The primary policies underlying § 1983 damages liability are
113
compensation and deterrence. Because the causation approach seems
to expand the scope of supervisory liability more than the constitutional
approach, and therefore beyond the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself (although a constitutional violation by a subordinate is
always required), it would appear that § 1983’s compensation and
deterrence policies are better promoted by the causation approach.
However, it may not be that simple. Recall the earlier hypotheticals.
To the extent that the causation approach tends to expand the scope of
supervisory liability to cover cases involving constitutional provisions
requiring more than deliberate indifference (as in Iqbal itself), then the
compensation and deterrence policies of § 1983 are promoted. Indeed,
the Iqbal Court would probably characterize this as over-protecting
constitutional rights. On the other hand, the causation approach may
tend to limit the scope of supervisory liability in cases involving
constitutional provisions requiring less than deliberate indifference,
110

Apart from immunities, of course.
Recall that Justice Souter in his Iqbal dissent did his best to treat the Court’s
supervisory liability discussion as grounded on Bivens and not § 1983. See supra note
69 and accompanying text. Thus, Iqbal could conceivably be limited to supervisory
liability Bivens actions. But it is difficult to believe, particularly in light of the Court’s
repeated assertions in Iqbal and elsewhere that the jurisprudence of Bivens and § 1983
is fundamentally the same (except for § 1983 local government liability), that the
Court would ever buy into such a dual view of Bivens and § 1983 supervisory liability
actions.
112
See, e.g, Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1985); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in
Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Nahmod, Courtroom to Street, supra note
32; Nahmod, Constitutional Damages, supra note 40; Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983
and the “Background” of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Christina B. Whitman,
Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225 (1986). See also 1
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, §§ 1:5–1:9.
113
There is also a punitive function with regard to individual defendants who can
be liable for punitive damages. See supra note 24.
111
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especially in Fourth Amendment cases, thereby possibly under-protecting
them. In such cases, then, where plaintiffs are not able to prove
deliberate indifference, plaintiffs will lose against the supervisors under
the causation approach whereas they would have won under the
constitutional approach if they could prove objectively unreasonable
114
behavior, a lesser requirement, on the part of supervisors.
In contrast to these instances of possible over- and under-protection
of constitutional rights under the causation approach, the constitutional
approach neither over- nor under-protects. The requisite constitutional
state of mind, or fault, is intimately connected to the potential damages
liability (apart from immunities) for violating the underlying
constitutional provision. The constitutional approach thus directly
promotes § 1983’s policies of compensation and deterrence for
115
Fourteenth Amendment violations. It situates the state of mind, or
fault, requirement in the underlying constitutional provision itself, which
is appropriate for a statute that was enacted under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce § 1.
Finally, another advantage of the constitutional approach for
supervisory liability is that it simplifies what would otherwise be a
complicated qualified immunity inquiry. Consider that, under the
causation approach, the qualified immunity inquiry must take account
not only of the constitutional norm applicable to the subordinate but
also the deliberate indifference of the supervisor. The First Circuit
described it this way:
When a supervisor seeks qualified immunity in a section 1983
action, the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry is satisfied when (1) the subordinate’s actions violated a
clearly established constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly
established that a supervisor would be liable for constitutional
violations perpetrated by his subordinates in that context. In other
words, for a supervisor to be liable there must be a bifurcated
“clearly established” inquiry—one branch probing the underlying
violation, and the other probing the supervisor’s potential
116
liability.
In contrast, under the constitutional approach, the first part of the
qualified immunity inquiry focuses on whether the supervisor violated
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The second part of the qualified
immunity inquiry focuses on whether the supervisor violated clearly
established constitutional law at the time of his or her conduct. Both

114
Of course, even apart from or in addition to supervisory liability, a plaintiff
can also sue the subordinate who violated his or her constitutional rights personally
under § 1983 or Bivens.
115
See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 19–22.
116
Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
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parts appropriately are inquiries into the constitutional norm applicable to
117
the defendant’s conduct, though at different times.
For all of these reasons, then—§ 1983’s suggestive legislative history,
its “or causes to be subjected” language, relevant policy considerations,
the straightforward nature of the constitutional approach, and the ease
of application of the constitutional approach for qualified immunity
purposes—the Court’s adoption of the constitutional approach for
supervisory liability in Iqbal was sound. This is so despite the fact that the
Court did this without briefing and argument and in the face of
defendants’ concession to the contrary.
However, there is one more issue to address, and it is a serious one.
In Harris, the Court expressly adopted the causation approach to local
118
government liability for failure to train. Can this be squared with its
adoption of the constitutional approach to supervisory liability in Iqbal?
D. The Constitutional Approach: Iqbal’s Inconsistency with § 1983 Local
Government Liability for Failure to Train
The Court got supervisory liability right in Iqbal when it adopted the
constitutional approach. In contrast, the Court incorrectly addressed
local government liability for failure to train in the seminal decision of
119
City of Canton v. Harris. In Harris, the Court did not even nod in the
120
direction of Parratt v.Taylor, which, it will be recalled, declared that
§ 1983 contains no state of mind requirement for the prima facie case as
121
a matter of statutory interpretation. It also paid little attention to
statements in prior cases indicating that local government liability was
premised on the unconstitutional conduct of the local government

117

It should also be noted that the constitutional approach to supervisory liability
simplifies the policymaker inquiry for local government liability purposes. In Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Services, the Court declared that local government liability requires that
the “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (emphasis added). Suppose that a high-ranking official,
identified as a policymaker (a matter of state and local law), is a supervisor. Under
the constitutional approach, it is only when he or she is found to have engaged in
unconstitutional conduct that the conduct is properly attributed to the local
government for local government liability purposes (even though the policymaker
may also be liable personally). See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737
(1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121–22 (1988); Pembaur v. City
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). See generally 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION,
supra note 2, §§ 6:23–6:31 (analysis of Supreme Court cases on § 1983 and
policymakers).
118
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
119
Id. Before Harris was handed down, I argued in favor of the constitutional
approach to the official policy or custom requirement for local government liability.
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29.
120
See Harris, 489 U.S. 378.
121
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981).
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122

itself. Instead, the Court unambiguously declared in Harris that the
deliberate indifference requirement for local government failure to train
liability is a matter of statutory interpretation, independent of the
123
underlying constitutional violation. In other words, the state of mind
required of the local government, or fault, comes from § 1983 itself.
In so doing, the Court was able to finesse the question of the state of
mind required for the underlying substantive due process violation,
namely, the alleged failure by police officers to provide medical care to
the plaintiff while she was in police custody. In addition, the Court may
have had a difficult time in conceptually wrapping its collective mind
around local government liability where a failure to train is alleged: after
124
all, how can a failure to train constitute an official policy or custom?
122

For example, in Owen v. City of Independence, which held that local
governments are not protected from § 1983 damages liability by qualified immunity,
the Court referred to injuries being occasioned by a local government’s
“unconstitutional conduct,” and held that local governments have “no immunity
from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations.” 445 U.S. 622, 650,
657 (1980). And in Polk County v. Dodson, the Court held that allegations of
unconstitutional conduct against a county and its board of supervisors did not make
out a prima facie § 1983 claim because the plaintiff did not allege “any policy that
arguably violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. . . .
[A] policy of withdrawal from frivolous cases would not violate the Constitution.” 454
U.S. 312, 326 (1981). However, neither of these pre-Harris cases involved failure to
train liability, which could explain why the Court did not mention them in this
connection.
123
Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. The Court declared: “We hold today that the
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom
the police come into contact.” Id. In a footnote, the Court explained: “The
‘deliberate indifference’ standard we adopt for § 1983 ‘failure to train’ claims does
not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an
underlying claim of a constitutional violation.” Id. n.8.
In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, the Court read Harris as follows: “We
held that, quite apart from the state of mind required to establish the underlying
constitutional violation—in that case, a violation of due process—a plaintiff seeking
to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has
led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the municipal
action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious
consequences. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.”
520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (citation omitted).
Ironically, Justice Kennedy, the author of Iqbal, read Harris the same way. See
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 856 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124
Failure to train cases are not pure failure to act cases but rather cases in which
inadequate training is alleged to have brought about a constitutional violation by local
government officials or employees. Inadequate training can thus constitute either an
official policy—the inadequate training program itself is adopted by the local
government—or a custom of inadequate training apart from what is formally set out by
the local government regarding training. Similarly, failure to supervise cases are not
pure failure to act cases but rather cases in which inadequate supervision is alleged to
have brought about a constitutional violation by local government officials or
employees. Thus, inadequate supervision can also constitute an official policy or custom
of the local government.
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Most of all, the Court imposed a statutory deliberate indifference
requirement in Harris because it was worried about the specter of § 1983
respondeat superior liability for local governments, just as it was to be
worried two decades later in Iqbal about respondeat superior liability for
supervisors. Why deliberate indifference in particular? Probably because
this state of mind occupies a middle position between strict liability at
one extreme and a malicious intent or purpose to cause harm
125
requirement at the other. Strict liability, and even negligence or gross
negligence with its accompanying second-guessing by a fact-finder, would
come dangerously close to respondeat superior liability, which is
anathema to the Court. And a generally applicable malicious intent or
purpose to cause harm requirement would be contrary to the Court’s
Monroe v. Pape “background of tort liability” approach to § 1983 statutory
126
interpretation. It would also seriously undermine the core purpose of
§ 1983: the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment through
127
compensation and deterrence.
In the local government failure to train setting, deliberate
indifference thus serves a gatekeeper function similar to that served by
128
the various constitutionally required states of mind described above.
Indeed, in further demonstration of this gatekeeper function and the
continuing judicial aversion to respondeat superior liability in the local
government liability setting, consider Board of County Commissioners v.
129
Brown, which involved a hiring decision by a policymaker. Here, the
Court interpreted its Harris deliberate indifference standard as
incorporating a very strict proximate cause requirement—the plaintiff’s
particular constitutional injury must be the “plainly obvious
consequence” of a city’s inadequate hiring decision—than was contained
130
in Harris itself. This led the dissenters to argue that the Court had so
over-reacted to potential respondeat superior liability, and had made
In order for an official policy or custom to be actionable under the constitutional
approach through § 1983, I have contended that it must be unconstitutional either
on its face or as applied by the local government’s officials or employees. See
Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29; 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 6:50.
125
Compare this with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–80 (1964),
where the Court, after considering the chilling effect of common law defamation
rules—including strict liability—on print media, held that public official plaintiffs
suing print media for defamation in connection with their official conduct had to
allege and prove at least knowing or reckless falsehood.
126
365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (the Court’s rational for rejecting a specific intent
requirement for the § 1983 prima facie case was that it “should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions”).
127
In contrast, the Court interpreted substantive due process—the relevant
constitutional provision itself—as requiring purpose to cause harm in the high-speed
police pursuit setting. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853–54. See also supra Part II.A.
128
See Part II.C, supra.
129
520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997).
130
Id.
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§ 1983 local government liability doctrine so arcane, that the Court
should reconsider its rejection of such liability made in Monell v. Dep’t of
131
Social Services.
Whatever the Court’s reasons for deciding Harris as it did, thereby
adopting the causation approach for local government failure to train
liability, the Court got it wrong. First, as argued earlier, the legislative
history and language of § 1983, while not conclusive, tend to support the
132
constitutional approach, as do the relevant policy considerations.
Second, the causation approach, unlike the constitutional approach,
does not provide the best fit between the local government’s fault and its
133
damages liability for the plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation.
Furthermore, there is no persuasive justification for applying the
constitutional approach to all individuals, including supervisors, while at
the same time applying the causation approach to local governments. This
improperly bifurcates § 1983: both individuals and local governments are
“persons” for § 1983 liability purposes and are subject to the same prima
facie case requirement with regard to the underlying constitutional
134
violation. As I have argued elsewhere at length, the official policy or
custom requirement for local government liability should be considered
the equivalent, for constitutional accountability purposes, of the personal
135
involvement requirement for individual liability. Both the official policy
or custom requirement and the personal involvement requirement call
for a constitutional violation by the local government or individuals
(including supervisors) sued under § 1983.
The Court may one day have to confront Iqbal’s inconsistency with
Harris’s adoption of the causation approach. As things now stand, the
constitutional approach governs § 1983 and Bivens individual liability
while the causation approach governs § 1983 local government failure to
train liability.
V. CONCLUSION
I have focused on two aspects of Iqbal in revisiting the choice
between the constitutional approach and the causation approach. The
first is the Court’s increasing concern with over-deterrence in the § 1983
and Bivens setting, a concern that has moved from individual
immunities—where it has traditionally been located—through the
underlying constitutional provisions, and has culminated in the
131
Brown, 520 U.S. at 430–31 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J. and Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
132
See supra Part IV.C.
133
See the discussion at Part IV.B of the real world fit between fault and damages
liability in the supervisory liability setting. I suggested there that the fit is better under
the constitutional approach.
134
Immunities are a different matter.
135
See Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability, supra note 4, at 24–29. See also 2 CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 2, § 6:50.
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imposition of a “plausibility” requirement for notice pleading that will
inevitably be applied to plaintiffs’ complaints with considerable bite in
§ 1983 and Bivens cases.
The second is the Court’s adoption in Iqbal of the constitutional
approach for supervisory liability—one that I previously advocated and
that I still believe to be sound—and the Court’s rejection of the causation
approach for supervisory liability. Even though Iqbal inadequately
analyzed the issue, in the end the Court reached the correct result for
§ 1983 and Bivens supervisory liability. It brought supervisory liability in
line with other kinds of individual liability under § 1983 and Bivens. Yet
the causation approach is the very one that the Court incorrectly adopted
136
in Harris for § 1983 local government failure to train liability. This
inconsistency is unfortunate.
Simply put, § 1983 creates a Fourteenth Amendment damages action
against state and local government officials and against local
governments themselves. It is the Fourteenth Amendment’s
constitutional norms that establish the state of mind, or fault, required of
“[e]very person” for the § 1983 prima facie case. And it is the content of
those constitutional norms that should be the threshold consideration in
addressing the § 1983 prima facie case.

136

And, by implication, for failure to supervise. See supra note 119 and
accompanying text.

